Beyond Truth‐Telling: A Replication Study on School Choice
In a recent paper, Fack et al. (2019, American Economic Review) convincingly argue and theoretically demonstrate that there may be strong incentives for students to play non‐truth‐telling strategies when reporting preferences over schools, even when the celebrated deferred acceptance algorithm is employed. Their statistical test also rejects the (weak) truth‐telling assumption in favour of another assumption, called stability, using a single data set on school choice in Paris. This paper uses Swedish school choice data and replicates their empirical finding in 45 of the 57 investigated data sets ( value threshold 0.05).
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D. Gale, L. S. Shapley
Rustamdjan Hakimov, Dorothea Kübler
Alex Rees-Jones, Ran Shorrer
- Published
- Jan 08, 2026
- Vol/Issue
- 41(3)
- Pages
- 323-329
- License
- View
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