Campaign competition and policy responsiveness in direct legislation elections

Elisabeth R. Gerber; Arthur Lupia

doi:10.1007/bf01498598

journal article Sep 01, 1995

Campaign competition and policy responsiveness in direct legislation elections

Elisabeth R. Gerber Arthur Lupia

Political Behavior Vol. 17 No. 3 pp. 287-306 · Springer Science and Business Media LLC

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Job Market Signaling

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Published: Sep 01, 1995
Vol/Issue: 17(3)
Pages: 287-306
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Cite This Article

Elisabeth R. Gerber, Arthur Lupia (1995). Campaign competition and policy responsiveness in direct legislation elections. Political Behavior, 17(3), 287-306. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01498598

Campaign competition and policy responsiveness in direct legislation elections

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