journal article
Jan 01, 1999
The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity
Abstract
Contemporary Bayesian confirmation theorists measure degree of (incremental) confirmation using a variety of non-equivalent relevance measures. As a result, a great many of the arguments surrounding quantitative Bayesian confirmation theory are implicitly sensitive to choice of measure of confirmation. Such arguments are enthymematic, since they tacitly presuppose that certain relevance measures should be used (for various purposes) rather than other relevance measures that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature. I present a survey of this pervasive class of Bayesian confirmation-theoretic enthymemes, and a brief analysis of some recent attempts to resolve the problem of measure sensitivity.
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Metrics
190
Citations
32
References
Details
- Published
- Jan 01, 1999
- Vol/Issue
- 66(S3)
- Pages
- S362-S378
- License
- View
Authors
Cite This Article
Branden Fitelson (1999). The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity. Philosophy of Science, 66(S3), S362-S378. https://doi.org/10.1086/392738
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