journal article Apr 01, 2006

Epistemic Partiality in Friendship

Ethics Vol. 116 No. 3 pp. 498-524 · University of Chicago Press
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References
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Richard E. Nisbett, Timothy D. Wilson

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 10.1037/0022-3514.35.4.250
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Cited By
188
Philosophical Studies
Philosophical Studies
Metrics
188
Citations
31
References
Details
Published
Apr 01, 2006
Vol/Issue
116(3)
Pages
498-524
Cite This Article
Sarah Stroud (2006). Epistemic Partiality in Friendship. Ethics, 116(3), 498-524. https://doi.org/10.1086/500337
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