Sir, Yes, Sir! Hierarchy, Coups and the Political Preferences of Army Officers

Gustavo Fajardo

doi:10.1093/ej/ueaa012

journal article Feb 01, 2020

Sir, Yes, Sir! Hierarchy, Coups and the Political Preferences of Army Officers

Gustavo Fajardo

The Economic Journal Vol. 130 No. 629 pp. 1317-1345 · Oxford University Press (OUP)

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Abstract

ABSTRACT
I show that coups that break the chain of command polarise the military along hierarchical lines. I study an instance of Venezuelan history in which the political preferences of individual members of the army towards former coup leader Hugo Chávez became observable. Outranking Chávez at the time of the insubordination increases the probability of later opposing his presidency. Causal estimates rely on a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, where minimum time requirements for promotion in the army provide exogenous variation in the ranking of officers at the time of the coup. I discuss implications for the literature on civil–military relations.

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References

Details

Published: Feb 01, 2020
Vol/Issue: 130(629)
Pages: 1317-1345
License: View

Authors

G

Gustavo Fajardo

CAF-Development Bank of Latin America

Cite This Article

Gustavo Fajardo (2020). Sir, Yes, Sir! Hierarchy, Coups and the Political Preferences of Army Officers. The Economic Journal, 130(629), 1317-1345. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa012

Sir, Yes, Sir! Hierarchy, Coups and the Political Preferences of Army Officers

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