Corruption and tax revenues: Evidence from Italian regions

Salvatore Capasso; Lorenzo Cicatiello; Elina De Simone; Lodovico Santoro

doi:10.1111/apce.12356

journal article Nov 09, 2021

Corruption and tax revenues: Evidence from Italian regions

Salvatore Capasso Lorenzo Cicatiello

Elina De Simone

Lodovico Santoro

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics Vol. 93 No. 4 pp. 1129-1152 · Wiley

View at Publisher Save 10.1111/apce.12356

Abstract

AbstractThis paper investigates the impact of corruption on tax revenues. Drawing on Italian regional data that distinguish between corruption crimes in which public officers play an active role (active corruption) and crimes in which there is collusion between the public officers and their private counterparts (passive corruption), the paper shows that only active corruption harms tax revenues. We argue that active corruption alters the incentives for honest taxpayers, leading to inefficiencies and a greater distance between citizens and public authorities, because it generates uncooperative public administration and reduces the perceived fairness of public systems. The estimates confirm the hypothesis and the results call for greater attention to be paid to the quality of public administration.

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Details

Published: Nov 09, 2021
Vol/Issue: 93(4)
Pages: 1129-1152
License: View

Authors

S

Salvatore Capasso

ISMed ‐ CNR Department of Business and Economic Studies ‐ University of Naples Parthenope and CSEF ‐ University Federico II Italy

L

Lorenzo Cicatiello

Dipartimento di Matematica, Informatica ed Economia (DiMIE) Universita degli Studi della Basilicata Italy

E

Elina De Simone

Department of Economics Roma Tre University Italy

L

Lodovico Santoro

Italian Revenue Agency

Cite This Article

Salvatore Capasso, Lorenzo Cicatiello, Elina De Simone, et al. (2021). Corruption and tax revenues: Evidence from Italian regions. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 93(4), 1129-1152. https://doi.org/10.1111/apce.12356

Corruption and tax revenues: Evidence from Italian regions

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