journal article Mar 15, 2021

The dark side of shareholder litigation: Evidence from corporate takeovers

Financial Management Vol. 50 No. 3 pp. 845-873 · Wiley
View at Publisher Save 10.1111/fima.12342
Abstract
AbstractExploiting staggered adoption of the universal demand (UD) laws by 23 states between 1989 and 2005 that makes filing shareholder derivative litigations more difficult, we show that reduced litigation threats improve corporate takeover efficiency. Using a difference‐in‐differences approach, we find that acquirers experience higher announcement returns and better postmerger operating performance after the UD laws. Further analysis suggests that acquirers make suboptimal merger decisions to avoid litigation. Taken together, we show that litigation risk can distort managers’ incentives and destroy value ex ante.
Topics

No keywords indexed for this article. Browse by subject →

References
62
[4]
Appel I. (2019)
[5]
Badawi A. B. "The shareholder wealth effects of Delaware litigation" American Law and Economics Review (2017)
[6]
Fiduciary Duties and Equity-debtholder Conflicts

Bo Becker, Per Stromberg

Review of Financial Studies 10.1093/rfs/hhs006
[7]
Corporate Innovations and Mergers and Acquisitions

JAN BENA, Kai Li

The Journal of Finance 10.1111/jofi.12059
[8]
How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates?

M. Bertrand, E. Duflo, S. Mullainathan

The Quarterly Journal of Economics 10.1162/003355304772839588
[9]
Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences

Marianne Bertrand, Sendhil Mullainathan

Journal of Political Economy 10.1086/376950
[12]
Block D. J. "Derivative litigation: Current law versus the American law institute" The Business Lawyer (1993)
[13]
Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Disclosure: Evidence from Derivative Lawsuits

Thomas Bourveau, Yun Lou, Rencheng Wang

Journal of Accounting Research 10.1111/1475-679x.12191
[19]
Board connections and M&A transactions

Ye Cai, Merih Sevilir

Journal of Financial Economics 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.05.017
[22]
Cohen L. "Patent trolls: Evidence from targeted firms" Management Science (2018)
[25]
Executive Compensation and Corporate Acquisition Decisions

Sudip Datta, Mai Iskandar‐Datta, Kartik Raman

The Journal of Finance 10.1111/0022-1082.00406
[26]
Davis K. B. "Forgotten derivative suit" Vanderbilt Law Review (2008)
[30]
Friends with money

JOSEPH ENGELBERG, PENGJIE GAO, CHRISTOPHER A. PARSONS

Journal of Financial Economics 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.08.003
[34]
Fu F. (2017)
[35]
Shareholder-Initiated Class Action Lawsuits: Shareholder Wealth Effects and Industry Spillovers

Amar Gande, Craig M. Lewis

The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 10.1017/s0022109009990202
[41]
Jeffries B. "The plaintiffs’ lawyer's transaction tax: The new cost of doing business in public company deals" Berkeley Business Law Journal (2014)
[42]
Jensen M. C. "Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers" American Economic Review (1986)
[43]
The market for corporate control

Michael C. Jensen, Richard S. Ruback

Journal of Financial Economics 10.1016/0304-405x(83)90004-1
[45]
Institutional and Legal Context in Natural Experiments: The Case of State Antitakeover Laws

Jonathan M. Karpoff, MICHAEL D. WITTRY

The Journal of Finance 10.1111/jofi.12600
[46]
Kinney T. P. "Stockholder derivative suits: Demand and futility where the board fails to stop wrongdoers" Marquette Law Review (1994)
[47]
Shareholder litigation in mergers and acquisitions

C.N.V. Krishnan, Ronald W. Masulis, Randall S. Thomas et al.

Journal of Corporate Finance 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.08.004
[49]
Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Innovation

Chen Lin, Sibo Liu, GUSTAVO MANSO

Management Science 10.1287/mnsc.2020.3626

Showing 50 of 62 references

Cited By
38
The Journal of Financial and Quanti...
Metrics
38
Citations
62
References
Details
Published
Mar 15, 2021
Vol/Issue
50(3)
Pages
845-873
License
View
Cite This Article
Yongqiang Chu, Yijia (Eddie) Zhao (2021). The dark side of shareholder litigation: Evidence from corporate takeovers. Financial Management, 50(3), 845-873. https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12342
Related

You May Also Like

Capital Structure Decisions: Which Factors Are Reliably Important?

Murray Z. Frank, Vidhan K. Goyal · 2009

1,780 citations

A Simple Approximation of Tobin's q

Kee H. Chung, Stephen W. Pruitt · 1994

1,546 citations

The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance

Benjamin E. Hermalin, Michael S. Weisbach · 1991

1,437 citations

Corporate Stakeholders and Corporate Finance

Bradford Cornell, Alan C. Shapiro · 1987

874 citations