VOTING AND SOCIAL PRESSURE UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION

Alexander T. Clark; Nicholas H. Tenev

doi:10.1111/iere.12401

journal article Aug 06, 2019

VOTING AND SOCIAL PRESSURE UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION

Alexander T. Clark Nicholas H. Tenev

International Economic Review Vol. 60 No. 4 pp. 1705-1735 · JSTOR

View at Publisher Save 10.1111/iere.12401

Abstract

AbstractWe develop a model in which costly voting in a large, two‐party election is a sequentially rational choice of strategic, self‐interested players who can reward fellow voters by forming stronger ties in a network formation coordination game. The predictions match a variety of stylized facts, including explaining why an individual's voting behavior may depend on what she knows about her friends' actions. Players have imperfect information about others' voting behavior, and we find that some degree of privacy may be necessary for voting in equilibrium, enabling hypocritical but useful social pressure. Our framework applies to any costly prosocial behavior.

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References

Details

Published: Aug 06, 2019
Vol/Issue: 60(4)
Pages: 1705-1735
License: View

Authors

A

Alexander T. Clark

Peloton Interactive, Inc. U.S.A.

N

Nicholas H. Tenev

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency U.S.A.

Cite This Article

Alexander T. Clark, Nicholas H. Tenev (2019). VOTING AND SOCIAL PRESSURE UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION. International Economic Review, 60(4), 1705-1735. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12401

VOTING AND SOCIAL PRESSURE UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION

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