journal article
Aug 03, 2015
The Influence of the Chicago School on the Commission's Guidelines, Notices and Block Exemption Regulations in EU Competition Policy
Abstract
AbstractAntitrust rules are fundamentally informed and shaped by economic theories. Given the significance of EU competition policy for the European integration process, it is essential to disentangle the economic theories underlying EU competition law. There is abundant theoretical and empirical literature examining the influence of ordoliberalism on EC/EU competition policy. However, in recent years, ordoliberal principles appear to have been replaced by neoliberalism and efficiency‐enhancing rationale in EU competition policy. This article puts forward the idea of clarifying whether the European Commission incorporates Chicago School theory into EU competition law provisions. The analysis is carried out on the basis of the European Commission's guidelines, notices and block exemption regulations. The analysis reveals that the Commission does, to a considerable extent, follow the Chicago School theory. The elements of the Chicago School theory hold strongest in vertical practices; they are somewhat weaker in horizontal practices and in unilateral exclusionary conduct.
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Showing 50 of 72 references
Metrics
11
Citations
72
References
Details
- Published
- Aug 03, 2015
- Vol/Issue
- 54(2)
- Pages
- 267-283
- License
- View
Funding
European Research Council
Award: ITEPE-312331
Cite This Article
Dzmitry Bartalevich (2015). The Influence of the Chicago School on the Commission's Guidelines, Notices and Block Exemption Regulations in EU Competition Policy. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 54(2), 267-283. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12292
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