REDUCING OVERREACTION TO CENTRAL BANKS' DISCLOSURES: THEORY AND EXPERIMENT

Romain Baeriswyl; Camille Cornand

doi:10.1111/jeea.12077

journal article Mar 31, 2014

REDUCING OVERREACTION TO CENTRAL BANKS' DISCLOSURES: THEORY AND EXPERIMENT

Romain Baeriswyl Camille Cornand

Journal of the European Economic Association Vol. 12 No. 4 pp. 1087-1126 · Oxford University Press (OUP)

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References

Details

Published: Mar 31, 2014
Vol/Issue: 12(4)
Pages: 1087-1126
License: View

Authors

Swiss National Bank

CNRS-GATE Université de Lyon

Funding

ANR Award: ANR-07-FRAL-027-01

French National Research Agency (ANR)

Swiss National Bank

LABEX CORTEX Award: ANR-11-LABX-0042

“Investissements d'Avenir” Award: ANR-11-IDEX-007

Cite This Article

Romain Baeriswyl, Camille Cornand (2014). REDUCING OVERREACTION TO CENTRAL BANKS' DISCLOSURES: THEORY AND EXPERIMENT. Journal of the European Economic Association, 12(4), 1087-1126. https://doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12077

REDUCING OVERREACTION TO CENTRAL BANKS' DISCLOSURES: THEORY AND EXPERIMENT

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