journal article Jun 29, 2020

The Welfare Costs of Self‐Fulfilling Bank Runs

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking Vol. 53 No. 2-3 pp. 401-440 · Wiley
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Abstract
AbstractWe study the welfare implications of self‐fulfilling bank runs and liquidity requirements, in a growth model where banks, facing persistent possible runs, can choose in any period a run‐proof asset portfolio. In this framework, runs distort banks' insurance provision against idiosyncratic shocks, and liquidity requirements resolve this distortion at the cost of a credit tightening. Quantitatively, the welfare costs of self‐fulfilling bank runs are equivalent to a constant consumption loss of up to 2.3% of U.S. GDP. Liquidity requirements might increase these welfare costs by up to 2.4%.
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Showing 50 of 52 references

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52
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Details
Published
Jun 29, 2020
Vol/Issue
53(2-3)
Pages
401-440
License
View
Funding
Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique
Cite This Article
ELENA MATTANA, ETTORE PANETTI (2020). The Welfare Costs of Self‐Fulfilling Bank Runs. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 53(2-3), 401-440. https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12695
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