Target‐setting, political incentives, and the tricky trade‐off between economic development and environmental protection

Juan Du; Hongtao Yi

doi:10.1111/padm.12768

journal article Aug 02, 2021

Target‐setting, political incentives, and the tricky trade‐off between economic development and environmental protection

Juan Du

Hongtao Yi

Public Administration Vol. 100 No. 4 pp. 923-941 · Wiley

View at Publisher Save 10.1111/padm.12768

Abstract

AbstractDisentangling the relationship between economic development and environmental protection has attracted much attention from public administration scholars. While traditionally scholars approach the relationship from either a substitutive or a complementary perspective, we offer a nuanced perspective by examining how the target‐setting on economic growth shapes environmental performance. This article proposes an explanation for the impacts of gross domestic product growth targets on environmental performance based on a yardstick competition model, where the upper‐level governments use relative performance to create competition among lower‐level governments. We argue that a trade‐off exists between economic development and environmental performance; however, the substitutive relationship tends to transit to a complementary relationship when environmental performance is incorporated into the cadre evaluation system. Analyzing a panel dataset of economic targets and PM2.5 air pollution across Chinese cities from 2001 to 2010, we confirm the relationship between economic targets and environmental performance by highlighting local leaders' political incentives.

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References

Details

Published: Aug 02, 2021
Vol/Issue: 100(4)
Pages: 923-941
License: View

Authors

J

Juan Du

School of Public Policy and Management Tsinghua University Beijing China

H

Hongtao Yi

John Glenn College of Public Affairs The Ohio State University Columbus Ohio USA

Cite This Article

Juan Du, Hongtao Yi (2021). Target‐setting, political incentives, and the tricky trade‐off between economic development and environmental protection. Public Administration, 100(4), 923-941. https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12768

Target‐setting, political incentives, and the tricky trade‐off between economic development and environmental protection

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