journal article
Jul 01, 2005
When Do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?
Abstract
Previous research has documented only a modest success rate for imposed sanctions. By contrast, the success rate is higher in cases that are settled at the threat stage. In this article, the authors provide new insights about the circumstances under which sanctions cause behavioral change only after being imposed. First, the target must initially underestimate the impact of sanctions, miscalculate the sender's determination to impose them, or wrongly believe that sanctions will be imposed and maintained whether it yields or not. Second, the target's misperceptions must be corrected after sanctions are imposed. A game-theoretical model with incomplete information is used to develop and clarify the argument.
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Cited By
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How Do Sanctions Affect Incumbent Electoral Performance?
Political Research Quarterly
Brandon Beomseob Park · 2018
Metrics
84
Citations
32
References
Details
- Published
- Jul 01, 2005
- Vol/Issue
- 57(4)
- Pages
- 479-499
- License
- View
Cite This Article
Jon Hovi, Robert Huseby, Detlef F. Sprinz (2005). When Do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?. World Politics, 57(4), 479-499. https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2006.0011
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