journal article Jan 01, 2016

The Politics of Central Bank Independence

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Published
Jan 01, 2016
Cite This Article
Jakob <!>de Haan, Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger (2016). The Politics of Central Bank Independence. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2888836
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