Margins: Estimating the Influence of the Big Three on Shareholder Proposals

Caleb Griffin

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3588031

journal article Jan 01, 2020

Margins: Estimating the Influence of the Big Three on Shareholder Proposals

Caleb Griffin

SSRN Electronic Journal · Elsevier BV

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References

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Dawn Lim Index Funds Are the New Kings of Wall Street (2019)

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"See generally Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed" Reg (2003)

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Dionysia Katelouzou "Press forthcoming) ("U.S. regulators have not adopted a formal requirement of investor stewardship. Certain components of what might be deemed a stewardship function are implicit, however" While this technically applies only to securities held in employee benefit plan investment portfolios, it has affected proxy voting policy in other contexts as well (2019)

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"] (describing the activities of the Black-Rock's stewardship team, including performing "approximately 2,500 engagements annually, and undertak[ing] this activity on behalf of clients as a fiduciary regardless of investment vehicle or strategy type," and exercising "BlackRock's voting rights consistent with our firm's published voting guidelines"); VANGUARD, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP 2019 ANNUAL" BLACKROCK (2019)

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"governance-related" proposals, 22% of "board-related" proposals, and 3% of "compensation-related" proposals. VANGUARD 2019 INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP REPORT, supra note 31, at 29. State Street reports that it supported approximately 27% of "environmental and social related" proposals, approximately 28% of "governance-related" proposals, approximately 5% of "directors-related" proposals, approximately 62% of "compensation-related" proposals, and approximately 14% of "routine business" shareholder proposals" STATE STREET 2019 INVESTMENT STEW-ARDSHIP REPORT

[50]

Table 11 is based on data on the outcomes of shareholder proposals for the largest

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Published: Jan 01, 2020

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Caleb Griffin

Cite This Article

Caleb Griffin (2020). Margins: Estimating the Influence of the Big Three on Shareholder Proposals. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3588031

Margins: Estimating the Influence of the Big Three on Shareholder Proposals

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