Are Platforms Products? Section 230, the First Amendment, and the Rise of Products Liability Law for Social Media and AI Systems

<p><span>The dissertation shows how networked software products became legally invisible as a result of a doctrinal collapse between tort, communication, and First Amendment law. It </span><span>also demonstrates how plaintiffs articulated the difference between social networks, services, and software products in the multidistrict litigation (MDL) case of </span><i>In re Social </i><i>Media Adolescent Addiction/Personal Injury Products Liability Litigation</i><span>. Throughout the twentieth century, communication networks, services, and products were governed by different forms of law. Communication networks and services were regulated and constrained by communication and First Amendment law, while communication products, like television sets, fell under products liability law. This teleology continued </span><span>until the passage of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. As the judiciary interpreted liability for Internet platforms under Section 230, networked software products were conflated with ideas of free expression. In other words, courts understood harms rooted in product design and engineering as immunized speech. Nevertheless, networked software products operate like physical communication products because they rely on physical infrastructures, modular design architectures, and behavioral engineering </span><span>techniques to materially shape how users experience digital communication. This dissertation highlights how products liability law was revived by plaintiffs in the MDL case to make these immaterial products palpable to the judiciary. It also proposes a new framework for governing the user experience that distinguishes between product and speech. In sum, this dissertation argues that reinstating a product-based conception of digital consumer technology is necessary to capture the lived experiences of technology users.</span></p>