Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems

Paul G. Mahoney

doi:10.2307/1600055

journal article Jan 01, 1995

Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems

Paul G. Mahoney

The University of Chicago Law Review Vol. 62 No. 3 pp. 1047 · JSTOR

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Published: Jan 01, 1995
Vol/Issue: 62(3)
Pages: 1047

Authors

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Paul G. Mahoney

Cite This Article

Paul G. Mahoney (1995). Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems. The University of Chicago Law Review, 62(3), 1047. https://doi.org/10.2307/1600055

Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems

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