Personal Influence, Collective Rationality, and Mass Political Action

Steven E. Finkel; Edward N. Muller; Karl-Dieter Opp

doi:10.2307/1962065

journal article Sep 01, 1989

Personal Influence, Collective Rationality, and Mass Political Action

Steven E. Finkel Edward N. Muller Karl-Dieter Opp

American Political Science Review Vol. 83 No. 3 pp. 885-903 · Cambridge University Press (CUP)

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Abstract

We propose two models to explain why individuals participate in collective political action—a personal influence model and a collective rationality model. Each model overcomes the free-rider problem posed by conventional rational choice theory and left unresolved in previous research. The models are tested for legal and illegal protest behaviors, using data from a national sample and two samples of protest-prone communities in the Federal Republic of Germany. The personal influence model is supported for both forms of participation, while the collective rationality model is supported for legal protest. We discuss implications of the results for grievance and rational choice theories of collective political action.

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Metrics

211

Citations

38

References

Details

Published: Sep 01, 1989
Vol/Issue: 83(3)
Pages: 885-903
License: View

Authors

Cite This Article

Steven E. Finkel, Edward N. Muller, Karl-Dieter Opp (1989). Personal Influence, Collective Rationality, and Mass Political Action. American Political Science Review, 83(3), 885-903. https://doi.org/10.2307/1962065

Personal Influence, Collective Rationality, and Mass Political Action

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