journal article Mar 01, 1992

Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War

Abstract
Democracies are less likely to fight wars with each other. They are also more likely to prevail in wars with autocratic states. I offer an explanation of this syndrome of powerful pacifism drawn from the microeconomic theory of the state. State rent seeking creates an imperialist bias in a country's foreign policy. This bias is smallest in democracies, where the costs to society of controlling the state are relatively low, and greatest in autocracies, where the costs are higher. As a result of this bias, autocracies will be more expansionist and, in turn, war-prone. In their relations with each other, where the absence of this imperialist bias is manifest, the relative pacifism of democracies appears. In addition, democracies, constrained by their societies from earning rents, will devote greater absolute resources to security, enjoy greater societal support for their policies, and tend to form overwhelming countercoalitions against expansionist autocracies. It follows that democracies will be more likely to win wars.
Topics

No keywords indexed for this article. Browse by subject →

References
57
[4]
Walt (1987)
[6]
Russett (1991)
[7]
Olson (1991)
[8]
Olson (1982)
[9]
Agency Problems and Residual Claims

Eugene F. Fama, Michael C. Jensen

The Journal of Law and Economics 10.1086/467038
[10]
Lowi (1967)
[11]
Levi (1983)
[12]
Lamborn (1991)
[13]
Lake (1991)
[14]
Cooperation under the Security Dilemma

Robert Jervis

World Politics 10.2307/2009958
[15]
North (1981)
[16]
Lake (1990)
[17]
Friedrich (1969)
[18]
Singer (1991)
[19]
Separation of Ownership and Control

Eugene F. Fama, Michael C. Jensen

The Journal of Law and Economics 10.1086/467037
[20]
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm

Eugene F. Fama

Journal of Political Economy 10.1086/260866
[21]
Tilly (1985)
[24]
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

Michael C. Jensen, William H. Meckling

Journal of Financial Economics 10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x
[25]
Hirschman (1970)
[27]
Buchanan (1968)
[29]
Tullock (1980)
[30]
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures

Charles M. Tiebout

Journal of Political Economy 10.1086/257839
[31]
Levi (1988)
[32]
Lane (1979)
[33]
Ekelund (1981)
[35]
Waltz (1979)
[37]
Gurr (1990)
[38]
Doyle "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs" Philosophy and Public Affairs (1983)
[39]
Small (1982)
[40]
Stein (1978)
[42]
McCagg (1978)
[43]
Evans (1979) 10.1515/9780691186801
[44]
Doyle "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2" Philosophy and Public Affairs (1983)
[46]
Levy (1989)
[47]
Feldman (1966)
[49]
Snyder (1991)
[50]
Bueno de Mesquita (1981)

Showing 50 of 57 references

Metrics
414
Citations
57
References
Details
Published
Mar 01, 1992
Vol/Issue
86(1)
Pages
24-37
License
View
Cite This Article
David A. Lake (1992). Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War. American Political Science Review, 86(1), 24-37. https://doi.org/10.2307/1964013
Related

You May Also Like

What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data

Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan N. Katz · 1995

4,586 citations

Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War

James D. Fearon, David D. Laitin · 2003

4,145 citations

Two Faces of Power

Peter Bachrach, Morton S. Baratz · 1962

2,211 citations