Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War

David A. Lake

doi:10.2307/1964013

journal article Mar 01, 1992

Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War

David A. Lake

American Political Science Review Vol. 86 No. 1 pp. 24-37 · Cambridge University Press (CUP)

View at Publisher Save 10.2307/1964013

Abstract

Democracies are less likely to fight wars with each other. They are also more likely to prevail in wars with autocratic states. I offer an explanation of this syndrome of powerful pacifism drawn from the microeconomic theory of the state. State rent seeking creates an imperialist bias in a country's foreign policy. This bias is smallest in democracies, where the costs to society of controlling the state are relatively low, and greatest in autocracies, where the costs are higher. As a result of this bias, autocracies will be more expansionist and, in turn, war-prone. In their relations with each other, where the absence of this imperialist bias is manifest, the relative pacifism of democracies appears. In addition, democracies, constrained by their societies from earning rents, will devote greater absolute resources to security, enjoy greater societal support for their policies, and tend to form overwhelming countercoalitions against expansionist autocracies. It follows that democracies will be more likely to win wars.

Topics

No keywords indexed for this article. Browse by subject →

References

57

[1]

10.1177/003232928501400102

[2]

10.1177/0022002791035002010

[3]

10.1017/s0022050700096807

[4]

Walt (1987)

[5]

10.1177/0022002791035002007

[6]

Russett (1991)

[7]

Olson (1991)

[8]

Olson (1982)

[9]

Agency Problems and Residual Claims

Eugene F. Fama, Michael C. Jensen

The Journal of Law and Economics 10.1086/467038

[10]

Lowi (1967)

[11]

Levi (1983)

[12]

Lamborn (1991)

[13]

Lake (1991)

[14]

Cooperation under the Security Dilemma

Robert Jervis

World Politics 10.2307/2009958

[15]

North (1981)

[16]

Lake (1990)

[17]

Friedrich (1969)

[18]

Singer (1991)

[19]

Separation of Ownership and Control

Eugene F. Fama, Michael C. Jensen

The Journal of Law and Economics 10.1086/467037

[20]

Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm

Eugene F. Fama

Journal of Political Economy 10.1086/260866

[21]

Tilly (1985)

[22]

10.2307/2600540

[23]

10.2307/2010488

[24]

Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

Michael C. Jensen, William H. Meckling

Journal of Financial Economics 10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x

[25]

Hirschman (1970)

[26]

10.1177/0022002789033001001

[27]

Buchanan (1968)

[28]

10.1007/978-94-011-7627-9

[29]

Tullock (1980)

[30]

A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures

Charles M. Tiebout

Journal of Political Economy 10.1086/257839

[31]

Levi (1988)

[32]

Lane (1979)

[33]

Ekelund (1981)

[34]

10.2307/1960861

[35]

Waltz (1979)

[36]

10.4159/harvard.9780674422629

[37]

Gurr (1990)

[38]

Doyle "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs" Philosophy and Public Affairs (1983)

[39]

Small (1982)

[40]

Stein (1978)

[41]

10.1177/0022002784028004004

[42]

McCagg (1978)

[43]

Evans (1979) 10.1515/9780691186801

[44]

Doyle "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2" Philosophy and Public Affairs (1983)

[45]

10.1177/003232928301200401

[46]

Levy (1989)

[47]

Feldman (1966)

[48]

10.1177/0022002791035002003

[49]

Snyder (1991)

[50]

Bueno de Mesquita (1981)

Showing 50 of 57 references

Metrics

414

Citations

57

References

Details

Published: Mar 01, 1992
Vol/Issue: 86(1)
Pages: 24-37
License: View

Authors

D

David A. Lake

Cite This Article

David A. Lake (1992). Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War. American Political Science Review, 86(1), 24-37. https://doi.org/10.2307/1964013

Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War

You May Also Like