Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behaviour in First-, Second- and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders

John H. Kagel; Dan Levin

doi:10.2307/2234706

journal article Jul 01, 1993

Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behaviour in First-, Second- and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders

John H. Kagel Dan Levin

The Economic Journal Vol. 103 No. 419 pp. 868 · Oxford University Press (OUP)

View at Publisher Save 10.2307/2234706

Topics

No keywords indexed for this article. Browse by subject →

Cited By

306

Structural Econometrics of Auctions: A Review

Matthew L. Gentry, Timothy P. Hubbard · 2018

Foundations and Trends® in Economet...

Multiple equilibria in asymmetric first-price auctions

Todd R. Kaplan, Shmuel Zamir · 2014

Economic Theory Bulletin

Auctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment

Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Erkut Y Ozbay · 2007

American Economic Review

Experimental Auction Procedure: Impact on Valuation of Quality Differentiated Goods

Jayson L. Lusk, Ty Feldkamp · 2004

American Journal of Agricultural Ec...

Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions

John H. Kagel, Dan Levin · 2001

Econometrica

Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment

John A. List, David Lucking-Reiley · 2000

American Economic Review

Metrics

306

Citations

0

References

Details

Published: Jul 01, 1993
Vol/Issue: 103(419)
Pages: 868

Authors

Cite This Article

John H. Kagel, Dan Levin (1993). Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behaviour in First-, Second- and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders. The Economic Journal, 103(419), 868. https://doi.org/10.2307/2234706

Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behaviour in First-, Second- and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders

You May Also Like