journal article Jan 01, 1986

The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling

Ken Binmore Ariel Rubinstein Asher Wolinsky

The RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 17 No. 2 pp. 176 · Wiley

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Published: Jan 01, 1986
Vol/Issue: 17(2)
Pages: 176
License: View

Authors

Ariel Rubinstein

Cite This Article

Ken Binmore, Ariel Rubinstein, Asher Wolinsky (1986). The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling. The RAND Journal of Economics, 17(2), 176. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555382

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