A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997

Elinor Ostrom

doi:10.2307/2585925

journal article Mar 01, 1998

A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997

Elinor Ostrom

American Political Science Review Vol. 92 No. 1 pp. 1-22 · Cambridge University Press (CUP)

View at Publisher Save 10.2307/2585925

Abstract

Extensive empirical evidence and theoretical developments in multiple disciplines stimulate a need to expand the range of rational choice models to be used as a foundation for the study of social dilemmas and collective action. After an introduction to the problem of overcoming social dilemmas through collective action, the remainder of this article is divided into six sections. The first briefly reviews the theoretical predictions of currently accepted rational choice theory related to social dilemmas. The second section summarizes the challenges to the sole reliance on a complete model of rationality presented by extensive experimental research. In the third section, I discuss two major empirical findings that begin to show how individuals achieve results that are “better than rational” by building conditions where reciprocity, reputation, and trust can help to overcome the strong temptations of short-run self-interest. The fourth section raises the possibility of developing second-generation models of rationality, the fifth section develops an initial theoretical scenario, and the final section concludes by examining the implications of placing reciprocity, reputation, and trust at the core of an empirically tested, behavioral theory of collective action.

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1,895

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Details

Published: Mar 01, 1998
Vol/Issue: 92(1)
Pages: 1-22
License: View

Authors

E

Elinor Ostrom

Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis; Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47408-3895;

Cite This Article

Elinor Ostrom (1998). A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997. American Political Science Review, 92(1), 1-22. https://doi.org/10.2307/2585925

A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997

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