journal article Oct 25, 2020

Game Model of Retailers Leading Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Different Guarantee Modes

View at Publisher Save 10.46338/ijetae1020_13
Abstract
—In order to study the retailer-led differentiated guarantee behavior of CLSC's remanufactured products, assuming that demand is influenced by differentiated guarantee period of remanufactured products and consumers' willingness to pay, three game models of unguaranteed, manufacturer's guarantee and retailer's guarantee are constructed respectively to discuss the influence of guarantee mode selection and guarantee cost parameters on each member's decision. The results show that differentiated guarantees for remanufactured products are beneficial to extending the guarantee period, reducing the price of remanufactured products, improving CLSC members and overall profits. When consumers are less sensitive to differentiated guarantee for remanufactured products, CLSC decision in each mode has little to do with guarantee cost parameters and guarantor selection. When consumers are more sensitive, the advantages of each guarantee mode are significantly different, and manufacturer guarantee is the common choice of both parties. Finally, an example is given to further verify the conclusion.
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Details
Published
Oct 25, 2020
Vol/Issue
10(10)
Pages
71-78
Cite This Article
Wu Mei-xiang, Shi Cheng-dong, Sun Qiang (2020). Game Model of Retailers Leading Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Different Guarantee Modes. International Journal of Emerging Technology and Advanced Engineering, 10(10), 71-78. https://doi.org/10.46338/ijetae1020_13
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