An Evolutionary Approach to Norms

Robert Axelrod

doi:10.2307/1960858

journal article Dec 01, 1986

An Evolutionary Approach to Norms

Robert Axelrod

American Political Science Review Vol. 80 No. 4 pp. 1095-1111 · Cambridge University Press (CUP)

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Abstract

Norms provide a powerful mechanism for regulating conflict in groups, even when there are more than two people and no central authority. This paper investigates the emergence and stability of behavioral norms in the context of a game played by people of limited rationality. The dynamics of this new norms game are analyzed with a computer simulation based upon the evolutionary principle that strategies shown to be relatively effective will be used more in the future than less effective strategies. The results show the conditions under which norms can evolve and prove stable. One interesting possibility is the employment ofmetanorms,the willingness to punish someone who did not enforce a norm. Many historical examples of domestic and international norms are used to illustrate the wide variety of mechanisms that can support norms, including metanorms, dominance, internalization, deterrence, social proof, membership in groups, law, and reputation.

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