Reasoning strategies predict use of very fast logical reasoning

Henry Markovits; Pier-Luc de Chantal; Janie Brisson; Éloise Dubé; Valerie Thompson; Ian Newman

doi:10.3758/s13421-020-01108-3

journal article Oct 14, 2020

Reasoning strategies predict use of very fast logical reasoning

Henry Markovits Pier-Luc de Chantal Janie Brisson Éloise Dubé Valerie Thompson Ian Newman

Memory & Cognition Vol. 49 No. 3 pp. 532-543 · Springer Science and Business Media LLC

View at Publisher Save 10.3758/s13421-020-01108-3

Topics

No keywords indexed for this article. Browse by subject →

References

40

[1]

Baddeley, A., Logie, R., Nimmo-Smith, I., & Brereton, N. (1985). Components of fluent reading. Journal of Memory and Language, 24(1), 119–131. 10.1016/0749-596x(85)90019-1

[2]

Bago, B., & De Neys, W. (2017). Fast logic?: Examining the time course assumption of dual process theory. Cognition, 158, 90–109. 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.014

[3]

Campbell, J. I., & Thompson, V. A. (2012). MorePower 6.0 for ANOVA with relational confidence intervals and Bayesian analysis. Behavior research methods, 44(4), 1255–1265. 10.3758/s13428-012-0186-0

[4]

Individual differences in working memory and reading

Meredyth Daneman, Patricia A. Carpenter

Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 1980 10.1016/s0022-5371(80)90312-6

[5]

de Chantal, P. L., Newman, I., Thompson, V., Markovits, H. (2019). Who resists belief-biased inferences? The role of individual differences in reasoning strategies, working memory and attentional focus. Memory and Cognition, 48, 655–671. doi:https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-019-00998-2. 10.3758/s13421-019-00998-2

[6]

De Neys, W. (2012). Bias and conflict a case for logical intuitions. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7(1), 28–38. 10.1177/1745691611429354

[7]

De Neys, W., & Glumicic, T. (2008). Conflict monitoring in dual process theories of thinking. Cognition, 106(3), 1248–1299. 10.1016/j.cognition.2007.06.002

[8]

De Neys, W., Vartanian, O., & Goel, V. (2008). Smarter than we think: When our brains detect that we are biased. Psychological Science, 19(5), 483–489. 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02113.x

[9]

Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious. American Psychologist, 49, 709–709. 10.1037/0003-066x.49.8.709

[10]

Evans, J. S. B., Barston, J. L., & Pollard, P. (1983). On the conflict between logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning. Memory & Cognition, 11(3), 295–306. 10.3758/bf03196976

[11]

Evans, J. S. B., Curtis-Holmes, J. (2005). Rapid responding increases belief bias: Evidence for the dual-process theory of reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning, 11(4), 382–389. 10.1080/13546780542000005

[12]

Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition

Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, Keith E. Stanovich

Perspectives on Psychological Science 2013 10.1177/1745691612460685

[13]

Frey, D., Johnson, E. D., & De Neys, W. (2017). Individual differences in conflict detection during reasoning. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 71(5), 1–52. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2017.1313283 10.1080/17470218.2017.1313283

[14]

Gagnon-St-Pierre, E., Doucerin, M. & Markovits, H. (2020). Reasoning strategies explain individual differences in social reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000852. 10.1037/xge0000852

[15]

Handley, S. J., Newstead, S. E., & Trippas, D. (2011). Logic, beliefs, and instruction: A test of the default interventionist account of belief bias. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 37(1), 28.

[16]

Conditionals: A theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference.

P. N. Johnson-Laird, Ruth M. J. Byrne

Psychological Review 2002 10.1037/0033-295x.109.4.646

[17]

Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York, NY: Macmillan.

[18]

Markovits, H. (2019). Reasoning strategy modulates sex differences in performance on spatial rotation. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 72, 2870–2876. 10.1177/1747021819867203

[19]

Markovits, H., Brisson, J., & de Chantal, P.-L. (2015). Additional evidence for a dual-strategy model of reasoning: Probabilistic reasoning is more invariant than reasoning about logical validity. Memory & Cognition, 43, 1208–1215. doi:https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-015-0535-1 10.3758/s13421-015-0535-1

[20]

Markovits, H., Brisson, J., & de Chantal, P.-L. (2017a). Logical reasoning versus information processing in the dual-strategy model of reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 43(1), 72.

[21]

Markovits, H., Brisson, J., de Chantal, P.-L., & Singmann, H. (2018a). Multiple layers of information processing in deductive reasoning: Combining dual strategy and dual-source approaches to reasoning. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 30(4), 394–405. 10.1080/20445911.2018.1458729

[22]

Markovits, H., Brisson, J., de Chantal, P.-L., & Thompson, V. A. (2017b). Interactions between inferential strategies and belief bias. Memory & Cognition, 45, 1182–1192. doi:https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-017-0723-2 10.3758/s13421-017-0723-2

[23]

Markovits, H., Brunet, M.-L., Thompson, V., & Brisson, J. (2013). Direct evidence for a dual process model of deductive inference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 49(6), 1213–1222.

[24]

Markovits, H., de Chantal, P.-L., Brisson, J., & Gagnon-St-Pierre, É. (2019). The development of fast and slow inferential responding: Evidence for a parallel development of rule-based and belief-based intuitions. Memory & Cognition, 47(6), 1188–1200. doi:https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-019-00927-3 10.3758/s13421-019-00927-3

[25]

Markovits, H., Lortie Forgues, H., & Brunet, M.-L. (2012). More evidence for a dual-process model of conditional reasoning. Memory and cognition, 40(50), 736–747. 10.3758/s13421-012-0186-4

[26]

Markovits, H., & Nantel, G. (1989). The belief-bias effect in the production and evaluation of logical conclusions. Memory & Cognition, 17(1), 11–17. 10.3758/bf03199552

[27]

Markovits, H., Schleifer, M., & Fortier, L. (1989). Development of elementary deductive reasoning in young children. Developmental Psychology, 25(5), 787–793. 10.1037/0012-1649.25.5.787

[28]

Markovits, H., Trémolière, B., & Blanchette, I. (2018b). Reasoning strategies modulate gender differences in emotion processing. Cognition, 170, 76–82. 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.09.012

[29]

Morsanyi, K., & Handley, S. J. (2012). Logic feels so good—I like it! Evidence for intuitive detection of logicality in syllogistic reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology—Learning Memory and Cognition, 38(3), 596. 10.1037/a0026099

[30]

Newman, I. R., Gibb, M., & Thompson, V. A. (2017). Rule-based reasoning is fast and belief-based reasoning can be slow: Challenging current explanations of belief-bias and base-rate neglect. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 43(7), 1154. 10.1037/xlm0000372

[31]

Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (2003). Conditional probability and the cognitive science of conditional reasoning. Mind & Language, 18(4), 359–379. 10.1111/1468-0017.00232

[32]

Simon, G., Lubin, A., Houdé, O., & De Neys, W. (2015). Anterior cingulate cortex and intuitive bias detection during number conservation. Cognitive neuroscience, 6(4), 158–168. 10.1080/17588928.2015.1036847

[33]

Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 119(1), 3–22. 10.1037/0033-2909.119.1.3

[34]

Sobkow, A., Traczyk, J., Kaufman, S. B., & Nosal, C. (2018). The structure of intuitive abilities and their relationships with intelligence and Openness to Experience. Intelligence, 67, 1–10. 10.1016/j.intell.2017.12.001

[35]

Stanovich, K. E. (2018). Miserliness in human cognition: the interaction of detection, override and mindware. Thinking & Reasoning, 24, 423–444. 10.1080/13546783.2018.1459314

[36]

Stanovich, K. E., West, R. F., Ackerman, P. L., Kyllonen, P. C., & Roberts, R. D. (1999). Individual differences in reasoning and the heuristics and biases debate. In P. L. Ackerman, P. C. Kyllonen, & R. D. Roberts (Eds.), Learning and individual differences: Process, trait, and content determinants (pp. 389–411). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 10.1037/10315-017

[37]

Reasoning strategy vs cognitive capacity as predictors of individual differences in reasoning performance

Valerie A. Thompson, Henry Markovits

Cognition 10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104866

[38]

Thompson, V. A., Pennycook, G., Trippas, D., & Evans, J. S. B. (2018). Do smart people have better intuitions? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 147(7), 945. 10.1037/xge0000457

[39]

Topolinski, S., & Strack, F. (2009). Scanning the “fringe” of consciousness: What is felt and what is not felt in intuitions about semantic coherence. Consciousness and Cognition, 18(3), 608–618. 10.1016/j.concog.2008.06.002

[40]

Verschueren, N., Schaeken, W., & d’Ydewalle, G. (2005). Everyday conditional reasoning: A working memory-dependent tradeoff between counterexample and likelihood use. Memory & Cognition, 33(1), 107–119. 10.3758/bf03195301

Metrics

18

Citations

40

References

Details

Published: Oct 14, 2020
Vol/Issue: 49(3)
Pages: 532-543
License: View

Authors

Department of Surgery, Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Baltimore, MD.

I

Ian Newman

Cite This Article

Henry Markovits, Pier-Luc de Chantal, Janie Brisson, et al. (2020). Reasoning strategies predict use of very fast logical reasoning. Memory & Cognition, 49(3), 532-543. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-020-01108-3

Reasoning strategies predict use of very fast logical reasoning

You May Also Like