Preferences for Truth‐Telling

Johannes Abeler; Daniele Nosenzo; Collin Raymond

doi:10.3982/ecta14673

journal article Jan 01, 2019

Preferences for Truth‐Telling

Johannes Abeler Daniele Nosenzo Collin Raymond

Econometrica Vol. 87 No. 4 pp. 1115-1153 · JSTOR

View at Publisher Save 10.3982/ecta14673

Abstract

Private information is at the heart of many economic activities. For decades, economists have assumed that individuals are willing to misreport private information if this maximizes their material payoff. We combine data from 90 experimental studies in economics, psychology, and sociology, and show that, in fact, people lie surprisingly little. We then formalize a wide range of potential explanations for the observed behavior, identify testable predictions that can distinguish between the models, and conduct new experiments to do so. Our empirical evidence suggests that a preference for being seen as honest and a preference for being honest are the main motivations for truth‐telling.

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Metrics

632

Citations

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References

Details

Published: Jan 01, 2019
Vol/Issue: 87(4)
Pages: 1115-1153

Authors

J

Johannes Abeler

Department of Economics, University of Oxford; IZA; CESifo

D

Daniele Nosenzo

School of Economics, University of Nottingham; Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER)

C

Collin Raymond

Krannert School of Management, Purdue University

Funding

Economic and Social Research Council

Cite This Article

Johannes Abeler, Daniele Nosenzo, Collin Raymond (2019). Preferences for Truth‐Telling. Econometrica, 87(4), 1115-1153. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta14673

Preferences for Truth‐Telling

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