Sequential Information Design

Laura Doval; Jeffrey C. Ely

doi:10.3982/ecta17260

journal article Jan 01, 2020

Sequential Information Design

Laura Doval Jeffrey C. Ely

Econometrica Vol. 88 No. 6 pp. 2575-2608 · JSTOR

View at Publisher Save 10.3982/ecta17260

Abstract

We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the extensive form vary. An analyst may know the payoff‐relevant data but not the players' private information, nor the extensive form that governs their play. Alternatively, a designer may be able to build a mechanism from these ingredients. We characterize all outcomes that can arise in an equilibrium of some extensive form with some information structure. We show how to specialize our main concept to capture the additional restrictions implied by extensive‐form refinements.

Topics

No keywords indexed for this article. Browse by subject →

References

35

[1]

Aumann Journal of mathematical Economics (1974) 10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8

[2]

Aumann Econometrica (1987) 10.2307/1911154

[3]

Bade Journal of Economic Theory (2009) 10.1016/j.jet.2009.03.004

[4]

Battigalli Journal of Economic Theory (1996) 10.1006/jeth.1996.0082

[5]

Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games

Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris

Theoretical Economics 2016 10.3982/te1808

[6]

Bergemann, D., B. A. Brooks, and S. Morris (2019): “Counterfactuals With Latent Information,” Available at SSRN. 10.2139/ssrn.3324029

[7]

Best, J., and D. Quigley (2017): “Persuasion for the Long Run,” Available at SSRN. 10.2139/ssrn.2908115

[8]

Bognar Journal of Economic Theory (2015) 10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.008

[9]

Bresnahan Journal of political economy (1991) 10.1086/261786

[10]

Ciliberto Econometrica (2009) 10.3982/ecta5368

[11]

de Oliveira, H., and R. Lamba (2019): “Rationalizing Dynamic Choices,” Available at SSRN. 10.2139/ssrn.3332092

[12]

Sequential Information Design

Laura Doval, Jeffrey C. Ely

Econometrica 10.3982/ecta17260

[13]

Dutta Journal of Economic Theory (2016) 10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.004

[14]

Forges Econometrica (1986) 10.2307/1914304

[15]

Gallice The Economic Journal (2019) 10.1111/ecoj.12636

[16]

Gershkov Journal of Economic Theory (2009) 10.1016/j.jet.2008.02.004

[17]

Grieco The RAND Journal of Economics (2014) 10.1111/1756-2171.12052

[18]

Bayesian Persuasion

Emir Kamenica, Matthew Gentzkow

American Economic Review 2011 10.1257/aer.101.6.2590

[19]

Kremer Journal of Political Economy (2014) 10.1086/676597

[20]

Magnolfi, L., and C. Roncoroni (2017): “Estimation of Discrete Games With Weak Assumptions on Information,” Manuscript, University of Wisconsin-Madison.

[21]

Makris, M., and L. Renou (2018): “Information Design in Multi-Stage Games,” Technical Report, Queen Mary University. Available at https://www.qmul.ac.uk/sef/media/econ/research/workingpapers/2018/wp861.pdf.

[22]

Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems

Roger B Myerson

Journal of Mathematical Economics 1982 10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4

[23]

Myerson Econometrica (1986) 10.2307/1913154

[24]

Nishihara Economic theory (1997) 10.1007/s001990050172

[25]

Peters Journal of Economic Theory (2015) 10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.003

[26]

Renou Games and Economic Behavior (2009) 10.1016/j.geb.2008.05.001

[27]

Salcedo, B. (2012): “Implementation Through Coordination in Static Environments Without Commitment,” Available at https://www.academia.edu/2097082/Implementation_through_coordination_in_static_environments_without_commitment.

[28]

Salcedo, B. (2017): “Interdependent Choices,” Technical Report, University of Western Ontario. Available at brunosalcedo.com/docs/coordination.pdf.

[29]

Product Differentiation and Industrial Structure

Avner Shaked, John Sutton

The Journal of Industrial Economics 1987 10.2307/2098408

[30]

Sugaya, T., and A. Wolitzky (2017): “Revelation Principles in Multistage Games,” Technical Report, Discussion Paper, Stanford University and MIT.

[31]

Sutton (1991)

[32]

Sutton (2001)

[33]

Sutton, J. (2003): “Market Structure: The Bounds Approach,” London School of Economics.

[34]

Syrgkanis, V., E. Tamer, and J. Ziani (2017): “Inference on Auctions With Weak Assumptions on Information,” Preprint. Available at arXiv:1710.03830.

[35]

Watson, J. (2017): “A General, Practicable Definition of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium,” UC San Diego. Available at https://econweb.ucsd.edu/~jwatson/PAPERS/WatsonPBE.pdf.

Cited By

40

Sequential Information Design

Laura Doval, Jeffrey C. Ely · 2020

Econometrica

Metrics

40

Citations

35

References

Details